投资铁路公司 巴菲特看走眼了吗

美国圣达菲北部的一条铁路，由Burlington公司运营。

　　巴菲特(Warren Buffett)对铁路公司Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp.的收购，是他职业生涯中最老故事的最新一章。
　　Warren Buffett's purchase of Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. is the newest chapter in the oldest story of his professional life.

　　巴菲特的导师、“价值”投资的先驱格拉汉姆(Benjamin Graham)曾有几十年买卖铁路股票和债券的经历。早在上世纪50年代初，刚刚开始自己职业生涯的巴菲特就把穆迪(Moody's)大部头的运输业指南通读了两遍，以确保自己不会漏看书中的任何内容。在格拉汉姆旗下基金公司Graham-Newman Corp.工作时，巴菲特分析过一个将21%至36%资产投在铁路方面的投资组合。
　　Mr. Buffett's mentor, the pioneering 'value' investor Benjamin Graham, trafficked for decades in railroad stocks and bonds. In the early 1950s, at the outset of his career, Mr. Buffett read every page in Moody's voluminous transportation manuals -- twice, to make sure he didn't miss anything. Working at Mr. Graham's fund, Graham-Newman Corp., Mr. Buffett analyzed a portfolio with 21% to 36% of its assets in railroads.

　　但巴菲特这则古老故事还有更微妙的一面。格拉汉姆曾教导巴菲特说，企业管理层和股东间关系的核心是一种深奥的利益冲突。格拉汉姆认为，企业经理人总是想积累现金，以便在自己万一出现决策失误是对自己提供保护。但这些现金是属于股东的，他们或许能为这些钱找到比放在企业经理人手里更好的用处。
　　But there is a more subtle side to the story. Mr. Graham taught Mr. Buffett that at the heart of the relationship between management and shareholders is a profound conflict of interest. Managers, Mr. Graham believed, will always want to pile up cash to protect themselves in case they make mistakes. But that cash belongs to the shareholders, who may be able to put it to better use than the company's managers.

　　格拉汉姆还强调了一个令人痛苦的自相矛盾之处。企业经营得越好、其经理人越经营有方，企业的利润就越大，从而也导致企业的现金积累达到不合理的高水平。这也正是多年困扰巴菲特的事情，他和自己旗下的伯克希尔哈撒韦公司(Berkshire Hathaway)就是格拉汉姆所说这种自相矛盾现象的生动例证。由于巴菲特十分擅长于挑选股票和买进有利可图的业务，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司不断创造出远多于巴菲特自认为他能够有效使用的现金。
　　Graham also highlighted a painful paradox: The better the business and the more skilled its managers, the greater its profits, causing cash to pile up to unreasonable levels. And, to Mr. Buffett's own chronic discomfort, he and Berkshire Hathaway are living proof of Mr. Graham's paradox. Because of Mr. Buffett's extraordinary skill at picking stocks and buying lucrative businesses, Berkshire consistently generates far more cash than even Mr. Buffett thinks he can put to productive use.

　　早在1998年，巴菲特就担心伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的现金太多了，当时这家公司有1,220亿美元资产，手中的现金不足140亿美元。他在写给该公司一位投资者的信中说，“我一直明白，手中所管理资金的大量增加将急剧减少我们的投资选择空间。”这是因为那些几百万美元一笔的投资不再会对伯克希尔的业绩产生实质性影响。到了2006年，当伯克希尔积累的现金达到370亿美元时，巴菲特说，“我们不喜欢过多的现金......如果手头的现金只有100亿美元我们会高兴得多。”
　　As long ago as 1998 -- when Berkshire had $122 billion in assets and less than $14 billion in cash -- Mr. Buffett worried his company was getting too big for its britches. 'We have always known,' he wrote to a fellow investor, 'that huge increases in managed funds would dramatically diminish our universe of investment choices.' That's because investments of a few million dollars apiece could no longer make a material difference to Berkshire's fortunes. By 2006, when Berkshire's cash mountain had risen to $37 billion, Mr. Buffett said, 'We don't like excess cash . . . We would be much happier if we had $10 billion.'

　　巴菲特上周对笔者说，规模总是个问题。他说，如果只有一小笔资金可投资，你会把钱投入那些你认为特别值得投资的项目，而大多数时候，大笔资金是投资决策者的地狱。
　　'Size is always a problem,' Mr. Buffett told me last month. 'With tiny sums [to invest], it's extraordinary what you can find. Most of the time, big sums are one hell of an anchor.'

　　巴菲特不愿选择解决这一问题的最简单办法──将过多的资金以股息形式支付给股东。由于他本人持有伯克希尔约26%的股份，如果将公司现金作为股息派发，巴菲特所需缴纳的个人所得税将创下美国历史之最。巴菲特可不喜欢在这方面超越他人。由于巴菲特不愿将公司现金作为股息派发，他除了用这些钱直接购买大企业外几乎别无选择。
　　Mr. Buffett would rather not resort to the simplest way of solving this problem -- paying excess cash out to shareholders in the form of a dividend. Since he owns roughly 26% of Berkshire's shares, a cash dividend would saddle Mr. Buffett with one of the largest personal-income tax bills in American history. That's not the kind of thing at which he likes to excel. Mr. Buffett's reluctance to pay a dividend leaves him with little choice but to buy big companies outright.

　　巴菲特收购Burlington的支出中将有一部分是伯克希尔的股票，而他一向不愿用本公司股票收购企业。2007年，他曾表示1993年时以价值4.33亿美元的伯克希尔股票收购Dexter Shoe是不智之举，如果巴菲特当初不这样做，这批股票日后至少会价值35亿美元，而这些股票换来的Dexter股票最后变得一钱不值。橡树价值基金(Oak Value Fund)的卡尔(David Carr)说，巴菲特对这件事是如此敏感，除非他绝对相信随着时间的推移这笔投资能够产生良好回报，否则他不会用伯克希尔股票收购Burlington。橡树价值基金持有价值2,500万美元的伯克希尔股票。
　　Mr. Buffett is paying for Burlington Northern partly with Berkshire shares -- something he has long been loath to do. In 2007 he lamented buying Dexter Shoe in 1993 for $433 million in Berkshire stock -- which would later have been worth at least $3.5 billion if Mr. Buffett had not exchanged them for Dexter, which ended up worthless. 'He's so sensitive to this issue that I can't believe he would [pay in stock for Burlington Northern] unless he had absolute confidence that it will work out well over time,' says David Carr of Oak Value Fund, which owns $25 million in Berkshire shares.

　　今年79岁的巴菲特虽然尚无退休计划，但他希望确保伯克希尔的业务在他离去后仍能长久维持下去。他认为没有哪项新技术能够让铁路运输成为过时之物。巴菲特有时在判断哪项业务能永远繁荣方面会看走眼。以往，他曾投资制鞋业和报业，还曾印刷过百科全书。但巴菲特的这种投资态度对所有投资者都有重要借鉴意义：在你收购任何业务之前，都要问一问它承受新技术出现和价格竞争打击的能力有多强。
　　At age 79, Mr. Buffett has no plans to retire, but he wants to ensure that Berkshire's businesses will endure for decades after he is gone. He is betting that no new technology can make rail transportation obsolete. Mr. Buffett has sometimes been wrong about which businesses will prosper forever. Over the years, he's invested in shoes, newspapers and printed encyclopedias. But Mr. Buffett's approach underscores a key lesson for any investor: Before you buy any business, ask how vulnerable it is to new technology or price competition.

　　作为收购Burlington 这桩交易的一项后果，伯克希尔的B类股票将每1股拆分为50股，其股价也将从3,300美元降至65美元。这将使这种股票的价格多年来首次进入大多数投资者的心理接受范围内。高昂的股价一直令这些投资者对伯克希尔的股票望而却步。
　　As a result of the Burlington Northern deal, Berkshire's Class B shares will split 50-for-1, which would knock its share price down from $3,300 to $65. That puts the shares, for the first time in years, within psychological reach of most investors (who have long balked at Berkshire's high per-share price).

　　就像Burlington 一样，伯克希尔的股票市盈率也不低。巴菲特正在将数百亿美元投入到一家他认为只有温和增长前景的公司。这意味着美国股市的总体市盈率已经不低，否则巴菲特早会将这笔收购资金用在其他地方了。但巴菲特一直在修筑一道投资防波堤，也可以说一个工业方面的企业集团。虽然伯克希尔预计会渡过任何风暴，但该公司能否继续以现在这样高的幅度跑赢大盘则是另外一回事了。
　　Like Burlington Northern itself, Berkshire's shares aren't quite a steal. Mr. Buffett is putting tens of billions of dollars into a company that he thinks has only moderate growth prospects. That implies that the market as a whole isn't a steal, or he would have put the money elsewhere. But Mr. Buffett has built an investing bulwark -- and an industrial conglomerate. Berkshire is likely to survive any storm, but whether it can continue to beat the market by such wide margins is another story.